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Law, Morality And The Judge:
Robert M. Cover's
Justice Accused

RAYMOND L. FAUST

When Billy struck and killed the master-at-arms, Claggart, in Herman Melville's
classic Billy Budd, he became liable, under the terms of the English Mutiny Act,
to a sentence of death which was to be summarily executed by the captain of
the vessel on which the killing occurred. Captain Vere, on whose shoulders this
responsibility rested, perceived the injustice of the act's command, and in the
following soliloquy, delivered to the other members of the drumhead court convened
to hear Billy Budd's case, he wrestles with the problem of what he should do:
But in natural justice is nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be
considered? How can we adjudge to summary and shameful death a
fellow creature innocent before God, and whom we feel to be so?-Does that
state it aright? You sign sad assent. Well Itoo feel that, the full force
of that. It is Nature. (p. 110, Hayford & Sealts, ed.)
Captain Vere is here confronted with one of the judge's perennial ethical
problems: what does one do when the demands of his conscience or sense of justice
come into conflict with the commands of positive law? On the one hand, a
conscientious judge is likely to feel the need to conduct himself in a way he considers
to be 'right,' just and honorable. On the other, he is also likely to feel the demands
of his office and the public trust reposed in him. He will thus find himself in a
position wherein he is forced either to choose between two important and conflicting
ethical values or abdicate his bench and leave the decision-making to someone else.
In his book, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, Robert M.
Cover does not seek to answer the ethical question which Captain Vere had to
resolve. Perhaps no definitive answer is possible. What he does seek to do is to give
us a case study of how a group of antislavery American judges reacted when
confronted with the same problem in the context of slavery cases, and to suggest
some reasons for these reactions.
Given the emotional nature of the issue involved, and the difficulty of the moral
question, perhaps the most remarkable fact to emerge from Professor Cover's
study is that all the judges surveyed acted in the same way. To a man they
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followed Captain Vere (whom Cover suggests may have been patterned after
Chief Justice Shaw, Melville's father-in-law):
But do these buttons we wear attest that our allegiance is to Nature?
No, to the King .... Our vowed responsibility is in this: That however
pitilessly [the] law may operate in any instances, we nevertheless adhere
to it and administer it. (Ibid.)
Vere hanged Billy Budd; and all the judges included in Professor Cover's study
duly entered pro-slavery rulings where the law demanded, refusing to permit
conscience to interfere with 'duty'.
This result cannot be easily dismissed as the result of moral cowardice on the
part of the judges involved, nor as proof that their antislavery opinions were mere
posturings rather than deeply held convictions. This is so for at least three reasons:
1) the judges who made the rulings often suffered more for their adherence
to the law than they would have for departing from it, 2) what we know about
the men involved indicates that they were not unwilling to commit themselves to a
strong antislavery position outside the courtroom, and 3) the very eminence of
the judges studied-Justices Story and McLean of the U.S. Supreme Court and Chief
Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, to mention only
the most famous--raises at least some inference that they were principled men
acting in good faith.
What, then, explains Professor Cover's findings? His thesis is that the result
obtained flowed from the impact of three forces upon a judge: 1) the intellectual
framework within which he functioned, 2) what Cover calls the 'dialectical
environment,' and 3) his own temperament and self-image. And all of these factors
tended to point the judge in the direction of obedience to the dictates of positive law
at the expense of conscience.
The intellectual world of the nineteenth century judge was one in which the
two main concerns relevant to our topic here were what the judge's role ought to be
in the evolution of law in a democratic society, and whether a recognition and
application of 'natural law' was ever appropriate to a legal system. Professor Cover
reviews exhaustively the eighteenth and nineteenth century sources from which
American judges drew their ideas on these subjects, and studies practically all
of the antebellum slavery litigation to discover how judges actually applied these
doctrines in the context of slavery cases. What he comes up with is a sort of
intellectual profile of the antislavery judge, and how he thought.
The archetypal judge which emerges is a man who believed in an ideal natural
law which condemned slavery but acknowledged that the natural law did not
apply in any given jurisdiction except to the extent that it had been incorporated into
the positive law thereof, and one who believed that the national and state
constitutions were in the nature of social compacts, giving legitimacy to the state
and obligating its citizens, including judges, to obey its dictates. He was thus
a legal positivist. He was also a man concerned with the limitations of his legitimate
power, and much concerned to find rules of decision which would enable him to
keep his personal inclinations and prejudices out of the decisional process.
A man like this, who is both convinced of the legitimacy of the sovereign he
serves and of the desirability of finding and applying 'neutral' decisional rules,
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is quite likely to respect the limitations of his role and refuse to go beyond these, on
doctrinal grounds alone. But a judge never decides a case in a vacuum, without
some reference to its practical impact. And the personality of the judge can never
be entirely banished from adjudication. Non-rational and extralegal factors will
enter the equation. Professor Cover discusses some of these under the rubric of the
'dialectical environment.'
Basically, what is subsumed under this heading are those factors which tend to
challenge the demands of legal doctrine which we have been discussing. They are
a mixed bag of intellectual and emotional appeals. Cover identifies three as most
important in their impact on the judges studied: the ideological basis of advocacy,
the presence of-or potential for--extralegal action (i.e., resistance), and the
sympathetic qualities of the potential victims of injustice (i.e., the slaves themselves).
The first of these factors is a catchall meant to describe those non-legal
arguments which antislavery advocates aimed at judges both in and out of the
courtroom: impugning the morality of a legal system which could sanction slavery
and the men who can serve such a system, and appeals to a morality higher than
law which justifies disobedience to law.
By recognition of the second factor, Cover believes, judges became aware that
the formal resolution of a given case was less ultimately outcome-determinative
than it might otherwise have been (thus changing the stakes for disobedience to the
law's commands) and were reminded once again that many did not regard
obedience to the law as the transcendent moral value.
The impact of the third factor is obvious: the plight of the fugitive aroused
the judge's humane impulses and made him desire to give his aid.
Collectively, these inputs provided a heavy counterweight to the demands of
legal doctrine. And the scales became more finely balanced as it became yearly more
apparent that there was to be no institutionally permissible way to reform the
legal system to do away with slavery, barring a major political upheaval.
Professor Cover thus posits that the judges who were subject to these conflicting
inputs experienced what he calls 'cognitive dissonance,' which they sought to reduce.
He explains his theory thus:
The relevant elements of dissonance theory for this work may be
briefly stated: First, "dissonance" (a term for a sort of loose inconsistency)
among cognitions "gives rise to pressures to reduce or eliminate the
dissonance"; second, the presence to reduce dissonance will be greater,
the greater the personal involvement in the inconsistent "cognitions";
third, the greater the commitment to one "cognition," the less likely that
the avenue of dissonance reduction will involve change in that cognitive
framework; fourth, in choice situations, dissonance is always present because
of knowledge that any choice made is dissonant with the positive attributes
of the choice foregone; and, therefore, fifth, dissonance is "highest"
in situations where one must choose among closely balanced, inconsistent
alternatives. In such situations, according to the first premise, the tendency
to pursue dissonance reducing behavior will be maximized. (p. 227,
footnotes omitted)
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Cover's reason for introducing this theory into his analysis is because he thinks
that it will give him "a prism through which the judicial work of conflicted men
may be refracted with suggestive, though not conclusive, results." (p. 227)
Unfortunately, his prism refracts only white light. It generates a pretty pattern,
but is not very useful analytically. The problem lies with the test itself. According
to the formulation set out above, all the dissonance hypothesis can hope to predict
is that given a highly conflicted situation, and given that a certain course of
action has been chosen, certain behavior patterns will result which we can denominate
'dissonance reduction,' since they seek to rationalize and support the course chosen.
It thus requires as givens the two important characteristics which any useful
behavioral test would seek to be able to predict. All the dissonance hypothesis can
do is predict that attempts at rationalization will occur. And this is a truism.
The same thing is done every time any judge writes an opinion.
Up to this point, Cover's analysis is apparently correct, even though probative
of very little. Where he goes wrong is when he begins an effort to use his
dissonance hypothesis to do more than it can legitimately be asked to do. He seeks,
by the discovery of methods of dissonance reduction used in common by all the
judges surveyed, to make statements about the probable substantive future conduct,
not only of the judges surveyed, but of judges of a certain 'juristic competence'.
He suggests that all of the judges he surveyed in depth-Justices Story and McLean,
Chief Justice Shaw, and Judge Charles R. Swan of Ohio-used the following three
dissonance reduction devices: elevation of the formal stakes of decision-making,
retreat to a mechanical formalism, and ascription of responsibility for the
result elsewhere. From this he concludes
that from the many formulations that were within the juristic competence of the age, the antislavery judges consistently gravitated to the
formulations most conducive to a denial of personal responsibility
and most persuasive as to the importance of the formalism of the institutitional structure for which they had opted. (p. 229)
This, in turn, leads to another conclusion:
The consistent recourse to the highest justifications for formalism, the
most mechanical understanding of precedent, and the steadfast excision
of self and appeal to separation of powers suggests that it was the performance of troubled men in troubled times as well as the juristic competence
of their age that determined the almost uniform response of the antislavery bench to the call for liberty. Some performance characteristics are
idiosyncratic or random. But the predictability of the performance
characteristics outlined above suggests that given a particular juristic
competence, there will be very specific consequences to and limits on the
performance of judges caught in the moral-formal dilemma. If a man
makes a good priest, we may be quite sure he will not be a great prophet.
(pp. 258-9)
I take this statement to mean that it was partly the legal-intellectual milieu
of the times and partly the personality of the judge which determined the choices
he made. I would not doubt the truth of that statement. Indeed, it seems to
me wholly plausible, and very likely true. The only problem is that it cannot even
be suggested by the application of the cognitive dissonance theory. It is merely
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the author's untested inference from his evidence. As such it has no predictive weight
whatsoever. Indeed, if one takes the personality half of the formulation seriously, it
may be positively misleading. I have been able to find nothing which might be
called evidence that the judges studied shared a 'judicial temperament' which fitted
them to be priests but not prophets. And I can find no justification for an inference
that respected, experienced judges will on the basis of personality characteristics
usually present in such persons opt for the demands of law over those of morality,
more or less regardless of the 'juristic competence of the age.'
While Professor Cover's book thus fails as a case study exposing behavioral
processes valid beyond the facts immediately involved, it is nonetheless a fascinating
narrative. Cover is a lucid writer, and his handling of the legal doctrines and case law
with which the judges he studied worked is expert. Aside from the conclusions of
the author, this is a book from which one can learn a lot. And the ethical problem
which was the substance of the ethical dilemma in which these judges found themselves remains an important one, and still is unresolved. Despite the criticisms,
it is still a book worth reading.
Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975. 322 pages.
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